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Investment Provisions in 
Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
 
 
Gus Van Harten1
March 2008 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries are negotiating trade 
agreements with the European Union in six regional blocs. In December 2007, the 
CARIFORUM region was the first region to conclude a full ‘Economic Partnership 
Agreement’ with Europe. The Agreement includes provisions on trade in goods, services 
and investment, intellectual property, competition, and government procurement. This 
report examines the investment provisions of the CARIFORUM Economic Partnership 
Agreement as an illustration of the EPA model. 
 
Key findings of the report are: 
 
• The CARIFORUM Agreement requires the Parties to remove restrictions on foreign 
ownership of their economy in sectors where they undertake positive commitments to 
liberalize. It prohibits a variety of instruments that are commonly used to limit or screen 
foreign investment with a view to enhancing its benefits for the host economy. It also 
establishes an obligation of national treatment which is likely to preclude performance 
requirements that encourage economic linkages or protect domestic enterprises. 
 
• The EPA model, represented by the Agreement, appears not to account for the 
potentially adverse impacts of foreign investment on development and regional 
integration or acknowledge the role of government in preventing and limiting these 
                                                 
1 LLB, MES, PhD; Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, 
Canada; author of Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
Oxfam International is acknowledged as the funding source for this report. The views in this 
report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Oxfam International.  
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impacts. It sidelines domestic tools that can be used to encourage foreign investment, 
thus displacing the greater flexibility and adaptability that domestic instruments offer.  
 
• The Agreement establishes an obligation of most-favoured-nation treatment which could 
be read expansively to incorporate into the Agreement post-establishment obligations 
from other investment treaties, including access to investor-state arbitration. 
 
• By combining provisions on services and investment, the Agreement expands upon 
market access commitments in other trade agreements by including non-service (i.e. 
investment) sectors, and raises the prospect of future claims by foreign investors in 
service and non-service sectors alike. 
 
• Although the Agreement does not contain an investor-state mechanism, its market 
access commitments will trigger post-establishment protections, including access to 
investor-state arbitration, that are available to European investors in other investment 
treaties. This exposes CARIFORUM states to major liabilities arising from the prospect 
of direct claims by investors and damages awards against the state. Such claims may arise 
in any sector with substantial foreign ownership and are particularly prevalent in the 
energy and resource sectors and in privatized sectors. 
 
Key recommendations are: 
 
• In their consideration of a proposed EPA, ACP states should consider their position not 
only in terms of costs and benefits of their market access commitments in sectors 
covered by an EPA, but also in terms of their post-establishment commitments under 
other investment treaties. They may wish to link EPA negotiations to the renegotiation 
or clarified interpretation of existing bilateral investment treaties with European states. 
 
• The Agreement’s definition of the right to regulate, and its exclusion of a commitment 
to privatize public undertakings, should be strengthened. The Agreement should also 
clarify that MFN treatment is limited to the pre-establishment phase of an investment. 
The commitment in the Agreement to liberalize the capital account should be subject to 
the balance of payments safeguard. 
 
• The Agreement should preclude the arbitration under other investment treaties of 
disputes concerning the rights and obligations of the Parties to the Agreement, or of 
disputes that are the subject to dispute settlement under the Agreement. Negotiations 
towards an EPA also offer an opportunity to provide for investor claims arising under 
existing BITs between an EC state and a CARIFORUM state to be referred to the 
CARIFORUM dispute settlement process instead of BIT arbitration. 
 
• ACP states should avoid any further commitments to investor-state arbitration in an 
EPA or in any other treaty. Future consents to investor-state arbitration should be 
limited to investment contracts that are concluded in anticipation of a specific project. 
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1. Investment-related provisions in the CARIFORUM EPA 
 
The Parties to the CARIFORUM Agreement are the CARIFORUM states, acting 
collectively, and the ‘EC Party’, which includes both the European Community and its 
Member States, to the extent that the competence of each is implicated.2 This is significant 
because many bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have been concluded between individual 
CARIFORUM states and the major European capital-exporting states, acting individually. 
The Agreement is therefore a subsequent agreement to these existing BITs between states 
that are also parties to the Agreement. Further, the Agreement expressly preserves the rights 
of investors under existing or future investment treaties between CARIFORUM states and 
EC states.3 Thus, the Agreement expands upon, and does not limit, the restraints and 
liabilities that existing BITs place on the CARIFORUM states in the regulation of European 
investors. These aspects are critical to understanding the cumulative impact of the market 
access commitments undertaken in the Agreement. 
 
Substantive commitments 
 
The substantive focus of the Agreement’s investment provisions is market access and pre-
establishment investment liberalization. The Agreement thus requires the Parties to remove 
restrictions on foreign ownership and control of their economy in sectors where they 
undertake positive commitments to liberalize.4
 
In particular, the Parties undertake market access commitments in investment (ie ‘non-
service’) sectors, as defined by the International Standard Industrial Classification of all 
Economic Activities (ISIC Rev. 3.1). Commitments are made in these sectors: Agriculture, 
hunting and forestry; Fishing; Mining and quarrying; and Manufacturing; and in the sub-
sector of Production, transmission and distribution on own account of electricity, gas, steam 
and hot water [see Appendix B]. In turn, all sub-sectors within these sectors are liberalized, 
barring a specific reservation taken by the state in question. In addition, the Agreement 
contains extensive market access concessions in sectors that are styled as ‘services’ under the 
ISIC methodology, but that would also qualify as investment under the broad definitions of 
that concept in BITs which, unlike the CARIFORUM Agreement, restrict post-
establishment regulation of foreign investors by the CARIFORUM states. 
 
In the liberalized sectors, a variety of instruments that are commonly used to limit or screen 
foreign investment, with a view to enhancing its benefits for the local, national, or regional 
economy, are prohibited. These include the imposition of various restrictions or conditions 
on foreign investment, including limits on the number or share of foreign firms in a sector, 
limits on the proportion of a firm or industry that is foreign-owned, the use of an economic 
needs test to approve proposed investments, or requirements to engage in joint ventures 
with local firms.5
                                                 
2 Part VI, Article 1. 
3 Part II, Title II, Article 10. 
4 Part II, Title II, Article 6(1); Schedule of Commitments on Investment (Commercial Presence) 
of CARIFORUM States in Non-Service Sectors. 
5 Part II, Title II, Article 6(2). The restrictions reflect the language on market access in the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Article XVI(1). 
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Further, in the liberalized sectors, the Agreement establishes a general obligation of national 
treatment for foreign investments and investors, relative to their domestic counterparts.6 
The Parties may not treat domestic firms in a way that alters the conditions of competition 
in their favour relative to foreign firms. (Note that the Agreement does not prohibit states 
from treating foreign investors more favourably than their domestic counterparts.) The 
obligation thus likely precludes states from applying performance requirements (other than 
through subsidies7) to foreign investors as a condition of their commercial presence, 
including for example requirements to employ local personnel, use local materials, produce 
for export, or otherwise establish linkages with the local economy or protect domestic 
enterprises. 
 
Complementing these restrictions on the regulation of foreign capital is a more specific 
obligation not to apply capital controls to direct investments or otherwise restrict the 
repatriation of capital or profit from those investments.8 This operates to liberalize the 
capital account of the balance of payment, going well beyond normal IMF obligations to 
liberalize current transactions. Notably, the commitment is not subject to the Agreement’s 
balance of payments safeguards that otherwise apply in the event of a monetary crisis.9
 
A further commitment deals with most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment.10 It requires the 
Parties to make available any more favourable treatment to which they agree, in a future 
economic integration agreement with a major trading economy, to investments and investors 
covered by the CARIFORUM Agreement.11 The commitment acts primarily as a hedge for 
the EC states against the possibility that CARIFORUM states might grant more generous 
market access to other major economies. However, it could be read expansively in order to 
incorporate into the Agreement a host of substantive and procedural obligations from other 
investment treaties, including post-establishment protections (eg duties to compensate 
foreign investors for ‘regulatory expropriation’ or ‘unfair treatment’) and access to investor-
state arbitration. This expansive approach to the concept of MFN treatment is surprisingly 
common in arbitration awards to date. 
 
Interestingly, the Agreement requires both home states and host states for investors to adopt 
legislation on anti-bribery, labour standards, and international environmental and labour 
obligations.12 It also lays out provisions and a consultation mechanism aimed at checking 
inter-state regulatory competition to attract investment.13
 
                                                 
6 Part II, Title III, Article 7. Again, this reflects the GATS language, Article XVII. 
7 Part II, Title II, Article 1(3). 
8 Part II, Title III, Article 2(1). 
9 Part II, Title III, Articles 1 to 3. 
10 Part II, Title II, Article 9. 
11 A ‘major trading economy’ is any industrialized country, or any country accounting for more 
than one percent of world merchandise exports, or any group of countries accounting for more 
than 1.5 percent of world merchandise exports. Thus, a large developing states or significant 
grouping developing states would fall within the category. 
12 Part II, Title II, Article 11. 
13 Part II, Title II, Article 11; Part II, Title IV, ch 4 and 5. 
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Finally, the Agreement provides for future negotiations, within fives years of its entry into 
force, toward further investment liberalization.14
 
Coverage 
 
The Parties agree to liberalize capital flows relating to direct investment by opening their 
economies to foreign investors that are based in another state party and that engage in 
economy activity in the host state by setting up a commercial presence in its territory. 
 
‘Investor’ includes both natural persons and juridical persons. The inclusion of juridical 
person raises the prospect of forum-shopping by EC-based investors. For instance, an EC-
based investor that gains market access to Barbados as a result of the Agreement could 
channel the legal ownership of its Barbadian assets through Canada by establishing a shell 
company in Canada, in order to gain access to the additional post-establishment protections 
(including access to investor-state arbitration) that are available under the Canada-Barbados 
bilateral investment treaty.15
 
‘Commercial presence’ (ie investment) is not limited to economic activity that delivers a 
benefit to the development of the host state. However, the concept is apparently limited to 
direct investment (aimed at managerial control) rather than portfolio investment (not aimed 
at managerial control), given the requirements that a commercial presence – where made by 
constituting or acquiring a local entity – must be ‘with a view to establishing or maintaining 
lasting economic links’, and given that loans extended by foreign investors must be at least 
five years in duration.16
 
The Agreement applies broadly to regulatory activity of the state. First, it applies to any 
measure that affects the commercial presence of an investor, except for a limited range of 
measures that are expressly excluded.17 Second, it defines ‘measure’ broadly to include acts 
of any branch of the state (including the legislative and judicial branches) and of any level of 
government.18
 
Dispute settlement 
 
The Agreement is unlike other investment treaties in that it does not include an investor-
state mechanism that would allow investors to bring claims directly against states for alleged 
violations of the treaty, leading to an internationally-enforceable damages award against the 
                                                 
14 Part II, Title II, Article 3. 
15 Part II, Title II, Article 2. The prevalence of forum-shopping in international business means 
that the liabilities of host states under BITs are not limited to possible disputes arising from 
assets owned by investors based in the other state party to a BIT, but may extend to disputes 
arising from the regulation assets of investors based in third states who have channelled their 
investments in order to gain access to an investment treaty. 
16 Part II, Title II, Article 4(a)(i) note. 
17 Part II, Title II, Article 5 (excluding measures relating to nuclear materials, war materials, 
audio-visual services, national maritime cabotage, and certain air transport services). 
18 Part II, Title II, Article 2. The definition also extends to non-governmental bodies exercising 
delegated public powers. 
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state. Instead, dispute settlement is limited to state-state arbitration. Thus, the Agreement 
does not directly import the most troubling component of existing investment treaties: their 
use of private arbitration rather than a court (whether domestic or international) to resolve 
regulatory disputes between business and the state, and to delineate the policy space that is 
available to host governments. This is a positive aspect of the Agreement. Other positive 
aspects are that the Agreement assigns appointing authority to a public entity (the 
chairperson of the Trade and Development Committee), directs that appointments be made 
from a designated list of arbitrators, adopts a presumption of openness in arbitration 
proceedings, allows for amicus curiae briefs, and contemplates a Code of Conduct for 
arbitrators.19
 
On the other hand, the dispute settlement mechanism has important flaws. First, it allows 
the rulings of arbitrators to be withheld from public disclosure at the discretion of the Trade 
and Development Committee. Second, it limits the expertise of arbitrators to ‘law and 
international trade’.20 Third, it precludes the publication of dissenting opinions by 
arbitrators.21 Fourth, in terms of its interpretation, the Agreement contains purposive 
statements that permit arbitrators to adopt an interpretive presumption in favour of 
investors, to the detriment of the regulatory position of host states.22
 
Most problematic, however, are two potential areas of interaction between the Agreement 
and investor-state mechanisms in BITs. The first is that the CARIFORUM states will be 
exposed to claims against them by European investors whose investments are possible only 
because of the market access that is granted under the Agreement. These claims are most 
likely under BITs between a CARIFORUM state and an EC state, although they are possible 
under any BIT that allows forum-shopping. Also, for purposes of post-establishment 
protection, BITs define investment in ways that would include assets owned in ‘service’ 
sectors of ISIC as well as ‘non-service’ sectors. 
 
Second, the CARIFORUM Agreement’s exclusive use of state-state arbitration is subject to 
the proviso that arbitrators appointed under a BIT may rely on an MFN clause in the BIT to 
import CARIFORUM commitments on market access into the BIT arbitration. 
 
                                                 
19 Part III, Articles 6(3), 15(2), 16, and 20. 
20 Part III, Articles 19(1), 19(2), and 20(3). This expertise requirement can be varied only where 
both Parties agree to do so after a dispute has arisen, by appointing individuals who have ‘sector 
expertise in specific matters’. 
21 Part III, Article 19(1). 
22 eg Part I, Article 1(b) and (e). eg the Agreement includes among its objectives those of 
‘implementing an effective, predictable and transparent regulatory framework for trade and 
investment’ and ‘supporting the conditions for increasing investment’, but does not qualify these 
objectives with language to recognize the role of government in encouraging benefits and 
limiting costs of foreign investment. 
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2. Implications for development and regional integration in the 
ACP 
 
Implications of the CARIFORUM Agreement 
 
The CARIFORUM Agreement points to three assumptions underlying the EPA model. The 
first is that the conclusion of EPAs is necessary to attract foreign investment into ACP 
states. The second and third are that this investment will further the development and 
regional integration, respectively, of ACP states. I shall comment on each in turn and then 
conclude by commenting on the asymmetric character of ACP states’ concessions under an 
EPA. 
 
First, one must ask whether ACP states really need to use international law to attract foreign 
investment by constraining their governments at the domestic level. If investment is 
foreclosed by domestic measures, then states can open their economies by changing their 
own laws and policies. Also, if we accept that investment can have both positive and adverse 
impacts on a host economy and that government has a role to play in managing these 
impacts, it is arguably much more appropriate to amend domestic law so as to authorize 
governments to negotiate and approve proposed investments that are judged beneficial for 
the local economy on a case-by-case basis, rather than to adopt blanket commitments 
covering entire sectors at the international level.23  
 
Moreover, the evidence is weak at best that existing investment treaties actually draw in 
foreign investment, and there is no evidence that they are more effective in this respect than 
investment contracts.24 Without such evidence, it is inadvisable for states to relinquish their 
regulatory flexibility and policy space in a wide range of fields, in exchange for an elusive 
promise of beneficial investment that could in all likelihood be secured by other means. 
 
Thus, by sidelining domestic tools to encourage foreign investment, the EPA model 
displaces the adaptability that domestic instruments offer in terms of the tailoring and 
staging of regulation as the costs and benefits of market access in different sectors become 
more apparent over time. It is in this sense that the EPA model demands that ACP states 
relinquish core policy space; they must accept legal restrictions in a treaty instrument that 
lacks adaptability and that will be very difficult to adjust or withdraw from. 
 
A second assumption is that foreign investment made possible by liberalization will further 
the development of ACP states. But the EPA model does not account for the potentially 
adverse impacts of foreign investment for development or acknowledge the important role 
                                                 
23 The EC could play a constructive role in this respect by providing financial and other support 
for the development of domestic capacity to evaluate and approve specific investments. 
24 eg M. Hallward-Driemeier, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct 
Investment? Only a Bit... and They Could Bite’ (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 3121, Washington, June 2003) 4-5 and 22-3; P. Egger and M. Pfaffermayer, ‘The Impact of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment’ (2004) 32 Journal of Comparative 
Economics 788; J. Tobin and S. Rose-Ackerman, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and the Business 
Environment in Developing Countries: the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (Working 
paper, Yale University, 3 January 2005). 
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of government in preventing and limiting these impacts. In doing so, it unduly restrains the 
policy space of host states. They are foreclosed from adopting a selective approach to the 
admission of foreign investors, from negotiating conditions on foreign investment that 
would encourage linkages with the host economy and protect local producers, and from 
emphasizing South-South integration based on privileged market access. Further, in any 
sector where an EC investor comes to own substantial assets in an ACP economy, major 
liabilities will follow automatically under existing investment treaties that impose extensive 
post-establishment constraints on the regulation of foreign investors. 
 
In this respect, the CARIFORUM Agreement acknowledges that states have a right to 
regulate, but then expressly subjects that right to the Parties’ commitments on investment 
liberalization25 and to the post-establishment protections that newly admitted investors will 
enjoy under BITs. Thus, the EPA model requires states to relinquish their customary right to 
govern entry by foreign capital into their economies and to regulate foreign capital once it is 
established. This is authority has been used successfully by many states, especially in Asia 
and among the major capital-exporters, to develop competitive industries and national 
centres of capital before opening their economies to foreign ownership. It is also used widely 
by all states to enact regulatory measures that apply generally to investors, for a wide range 
of development purposes, and that will be fraught with risks and liabilities under BITs, once 
an EPA leads to expanded foreign ownership of the economy (see below). 
 
The second assumption is that foreign investment made possible by liberalization will 
further the development and regional integration of ACP states.26 This assumption appears 
naive, not to say disingenuous, in important respects. For example, in terms of regional 
integration, the Agreement states that ‘the provision of appropriate regulatory frameworks 
for trade in services and investment’ (including market access) ‘will contribute to the 
deepening of [the Parties’] regional integration process and the realization of the objectives 
of this Agreement’.27 This statement equates regional integration within the Caribbean 
region to regional integration between the Caribbean region and Europe. But the latter 
conflicts overtly with the former. Allowing market access by European firms that are based 
in larger European markets will spoil many opportunities for economies of scale to develop 
among Caribbean enterprises based in the Caribbean market. 
 
In resolving this conflict, what does the Agreement do? It expressly subordinates regional 
investment to investment liberalization.28
                                                 
25 Part II, Title II, Article 1(4) (clarifying that the ‘right to regulate and to introduce new 
regulations to meet legitimate policy objectives’ is retained, but only ‘consistent with the 
provisions of this Title’). 
26 eg Part I, Article 8 (stating that ‘development co-operation’ shall focus on various areas 
including ‘the diversification of CARIFORUM exports of goods and services through new 
investment and the development of new sectors’, without recognizing that foreign investment 
may also crowd out domestic enterprises and substitute foreign for local suppliers). 
27 Part II, Title II, Article 3 ter.  
28 Part I, Article 4(4) (stating that ‘the pace and content of regional integration is a matter to be 
determined exclusively by the CARIFORUM States in the exercise of their sovereignty and given 
their current and future political ambitions’ but that this is ‘without prejudice to the 
commitments under in this Agreement’). 
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Finally, it is important to highlight that the EPA model is asymmetric in that ACP states 
assume much greater liabilities in relation to investment than do the EC states because ACP 
states are overwhelmingly a destination for direct investment from the EC rather than a 
source of direct investment into the EC. The significance of this asymmetry is heightened 
further by the extent to which the Agreement delivers privileged market access to European 
investors, relative to other capital-exporting regions. Commitments by EC states under the 
Agreement should reflect the groundbreaking nature of this concession. 
 
Implications of the Agreement’s interaction with BITs 
 
One of the most important features of the EPA model, in light of the CARIFORUM 
Agreement, is its expansion of the liabilities that ACP states face under other investment 
treaties, especially their bilateral investment treaties with EC states [see Appendix C]. 
 
Existing BITs concluded by EC states do not contain commitments on market access but 
are instead limited to post-establishment protections for investors. They differ, as such, from 
the investment treaties of other major states, which typically include commitments on both 
pre-establishment and post-establishment stages of investment.29 In this respect, the market 
access commitments in EPAs are meant to ‘fill a gap’ in the BIT programmes of European 
capital-exporters by opening host economies to European investment in the manner of a US 
regional or bilateral investment treaty. However, once markets are opened by an EPA, the 
post-establishment protections available to European investors in European BITs will be 
triggered. 
 
This aspect of market access under EPAs is important because BITs, unlike the 
CARIFORUM Agreement, allow investor-state arbitration and thus expose host states to 
major liabilities arising from the prospect of direct claims by investors and internationally-
enforceable damages awards against the state. Under a BIT, any state measure, whether or 
not it is permitted under an EPA, may lead to a claim and a damages award under a BIT. 
 
The development implications of this are vitally important. Investor-state arbitration is a 
uniquely powerful means to discipline host states because (a) it allows direct claims by 
investors, typically without a requirement to pursue legal remedies in the host state, (b) it 
allows for damages awards for any regulatory act of the state, including legislation, and (c) it 
relies on private arbitration to resolve disputes in a way that is structurally biased against host 
states. To date, there have been well over 100 claims against developing countries under 
BITs, leading to dozens of damages awards. Numerous states have been ordered to pay 
awards worth tens or hundreds of millions of dollars. In many cases, awards arise from 
general regulatory measures that affect foreign investors indirectly and in unanticipated ways. 
As such, exposure to investor-state arbitration may impact, not only the fiscal position of a 
government, but also its ability to plan and cost out development policies that have the 
potential to affect the economic position of a foreign investor. 
 
                                                 
29 eg regional agreements like CAFTA, bilateral trade agreements, and US BITs.  
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Judging from the experience of other states targeted by investor claims under BITs, the 
liabilities arising from investor-state arbitration are especially prevalent in the energy and 
resources sectors and in sectors where state assets have been privatized. 30 In these sectors, 
countries targeted for claims have included Argentina, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Canada, 
the Czech Republic, Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, and Tanzania, for 
example.31 Most prominently, Argentina has faced dozens of investor claims arising from 
measures to address the country’s financial crisis in 2001, and it has lost all six claims that 
have reached the stage of a final award, leading to orders against Argentina to pay over $800 
million in total to European and US firms. 
 
Importantly, the general exceptions32 and other useful language33 in the CARIFORUM 
Agreement that emphasize objectives of sustainable development, food security, social 
benefits, labour standards, and safeguards for the balance of payments, will be of little use to 
the host state in an investor-state arbitration under a BIT. A BIT dispute, though it relates to 
an investment made possible by an EPA, will be resolved with reference to the terms and 
purposes of the BIT, and the great majority of BITs omit the general exceptions and useful 
language found in the CARIFORUM Agreement. Thus, once an investor is admitted to a 
state’s territory, any post-establishment regulation by the state that implicates a BIT (to 
which the investor has access) will not be protected by EPA exceptions on human health, 
resource conservation, direct taxation, and so on. 
 
* * * 
 
In these respect, the CARIFORUM Agreement has direct and indirect impacts on 
development and regional integration. Its direct impacts arise from the problematic 
assumptions that a treaty is required to encourage foreign investment, and that European 
investment will, as a rule, deliver benefits to host states in spite of the much reduced policy 
space of host governments. Its indirect impacts arise from the Agreement’s interaction with 
other investment treaties that provide post-establishment protections for foreign investors, 
including access to investor-state arbitration. In light of this interaction, different states will 
be affected in different ways by an EPA depending on the degree to which (a) the state 
might otherwise use its domestic authority to limit costs and enhance benefits of investment, 
(b) additional investors enter the state’s economy as a result of an EPA, and (c) these 
investors have access to post-establishment protections under other treaties. 
                                                 
30 In this respect, the Agreement does not mandate, but also does not preclude, the privatization 
and foreign ownership of public assets: Part II, Title II, Article 1(2); Schedule of Commitments 
on Investment (Commercial Presence) of CARIFORUM States in Non-Service Sectors. Indeed, 
the language of the Agreement suggests that privatization is an anticipated outcome of market 
access. 
31 The author was informed in 2005 by a legal advisor to the president of a large developing 
country that the cost of defending a single claim had consumed roughly half of the entire annual 
budget of the country’s department of justice. 
32 Part IV, Article 1(1). 
33 eg Part I, Article 2 (‘The Parties understand this objective to apply in the case of the present 
Economic Partnership Agreement as a commitment that: a) the application of this Agreement 
shall fully take into account the human, cultural, economic, social, health and environmental best 
interests of their respective population and of future generations...’). 
Investment Provisions and EPAs  10 
 
3. Implications of subsequent negotiations at a multilateral and 
bilateral level 
 
The CARIFORUM Agreement reflects an EPA model that imposes extensive restraints on 
the regulatory flexibility of ACP countries to decide whether to admit foreign investors and 
under what conditions, and thus limits the policy space that is available to host governments 
to manage costs and benefits of investment in light of their own development and regional 
integration priorities. In turn, by opening the door to much greater foreign ownership of 
their economies, the EPA model expands the liabilities of ACP countries under other 
treaties. States should therefore weigh the perceived benefits of an EPA against these 
significant costs and liabilities.  
 
To date, other agreements concluded by ACP states with the European Union are 
preliminary agreements that establish an initial framework for a full EPA. They do not 
contain investment provisions as in the case of the CARIFORUM Agreement, although they 
do contain a similar dispute settlement process. Also, most of these preliminary agreements 
contemplate near-term investment liberalization by requiring the Parties, eg, to ‘cooperate to 
facilitate all the necessary measures leading to the conclusion’ of a global EPA ‘as soon as 
possible’ and ‘before the end of 2008’, including provisions on ‘investments’.34 
Recommendations for these negotiations are discussed below. 
 
At the multilateral level, the CARIFORUM Agreement and other EPAs have the potential to 
undermine the will of ACP and other capital-importers to resist political pressures to make 
concessions on investment. This is particularly true in the case of states that have not 
otherwise conceded significant market access commitments in BITs or other treaties. In 
itself, the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties since the 1990s reveals the dangers 
posed by the inter-state competition among developing countries, encouraged by capital-
exporting states, to concede ever-higher obligations to admit and protect foreign investors. 
This poses an ongoing challenge to the groupings of capital-importers that have successfully 
opposed concessions on investment in multilateral forums, including the WTO. Notably, the 
CARIFORUM states, relative to other capital-importing regions, have not concluded many 
investment treaties that contain market access commitments.35
 
Thus, the more ACP states accept intrusive constraints in EPAs and other investment 
treaties, the higher the bar rises as to what qualifies as a hospitable investment climate, and 
the less each state can derive an advantage by conceding more to foreign investors than its 
‘competitors’ among other developing countries. By maintaining a unified position, on the 
other hand, ACP states enhance the bargaining position of capital-importers as a group, and 
the corresponding ability of individual states to target selectively their legal concessions to 
investors via investment contracts. 
                                                 
34 eg Agreement Establishing a Stepping Stone Economic Partnership Agreement Between Ghana, on the One 
Part, and the European Community and its Member States, on the Other Part, Article 44. 
35 As at June 2006, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago had 
done so with the United States, and Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago had done so with 
Canada. 
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4. Recommendations for review or amendment of the EU-
CARIFORUM Agreement 
 
The following is recommended for review or amendment before signature or ratification of 
the Agreement. 
 
The Agreement’s statement of objectives in favour of investment36 should include additional 
language that recognizes states’ right to regulate. Such language might draw, for example, on 
the Agreement’s definition of sustainable development,37 by affirming the Agreement’s 
investment-related objectives ‘while respecting the right of the Parties and of the Signatory 
CARIFORUM States to regulate investors in order to advance the human, cultural, 
economic, social, health and environmental best interests of their respective population and 
of future generations’. 
 
The Agreement’s definition of the right to regulate should be strengthened.38 It should track 
the more robust language used to protect the right to regulate in relation to the Parties’ 
commitment not to engage in regulatory competition in order to attract investment.39
 
The Agreement should clarify that any commitment to MFN treatment is limited to the pre-
establishment phase of an investment and that it does not extend to post-establishment 
protections or to procedural mechanisms that are available to investors under other 
economic integration agreements. 
 
The Agreement’s commitment to liberalize the capital account of the balance of payments40 
should be subject to the balance of payments safeguard.41 Further, based on Argentina’s 
experience in investor-state arbitration, the Agreement’s exception for security measures 
should include temporary measures necessary to address a monetary crisis.42  
 
The Agreement’s exclusion of a commitment to privatize public undertakings should be 
strengthened.43 Drawing on other exclusions in the same Article, it should read: ‘This Title 
shall not apply to measures affecting public undertakings or limiting the privatisation of 
public undertakings’. Further, the Agreement should preclude the application of post-
establishment protections in other investment treaties to foreign investments in sectors that 
are privatized following the conclusion of the CARIFORUM Agreement. The Agreement 
                                                 
36 Part I, Article 1. 
37 Part I, Article 2(a). 
38 Part II, Title II, Article 1(4). 
39 Part II, Title IV, ch 4, Article 2 (affirming the right of states to regulate ‘in order to achieve 
their own level of domestic environmental and public health protection and their own 
sustainable development priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly their environmental laws 
and policies’ and ‘in order to establish their own social regulations and labour standards in line 
with their own social development priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly its relevant 
laws and policies’). 
40 Part II, Title III, Article 2(1). 
41 Part II, Title III, Article 3. 
42 Part IV, Article 2. 
43 Part II, Title II, Article 1(2). 
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should also contain a general exception for measures relating to the alleviation of poverty or 
assurance of universal access to basic services. 
 
The Agreement should list additional areas of expertise, such as international law or human 
development, as suitable qualifications for arbitrators on the designated list.44 Also, as an 
accountability check, the discretion of the Trade and Development Committee to not 
publish an arbitration ruling45 should be limited to specific and legitimate grounds for 
confidentiality. Likewise, the Agreement should permit the publication of dissenting 
opinions by arbitrators. 
 
The Agreement precludes the arbitration of WTO disputes under the CARIFORUM dispute 
settlement process. It also precludes concurrent arbitration of the same dispute under WTO 
and CARIFORUM dispute settlement.46 However, the Agreement should include similar 
language precluding the arbitration (whether investor-state or state-state) of CARIFORUM 
disputes under other investment treaties concluded between states that are parties to the 
CARIFORUM Agreement. In particular, it should preclude the arbitration under those 
treaties of disputes concerning the rights and obligations of the Parties to the Agreement, or 
of disputes that are the subject to dispute settlement under the Agreement. 
 
The CARIFORUM Agreement provides an excellent opportunity to address flaws in 
investor-state arbitration under existing BITs between states that are parties to the 
Agreement. These might include, for instance, provisions to designate a list of approved 
arbitrators, to ensure openness in proceedings, to allow amicus curiae briefs, and to apply a 
Code of Conduct to arbitrators. Further, appointing authority for arbitrators appointed 
under BITs should be assigned to a public body in which voting power was allocated more 
equitably between capital-importing and capital-exporting interests. Alternatively, the 
Agreement could provide that investor claims arising under an existing BIT between an EC 
state and a CARIFORUM state are to be referred to the CARIFORUM dispute settlement 
process instead of BIT arbitration. Ideally, the Agreement would establish a standing dispute 
settlement body or international court, staffed by tenured judges, to resolve investment 
disputes under the Agreement and BITs. These are all feasible options, in legal terms, 
because the EC states that have concluded BITs with CARIFORUM states are also parties 
to the CARIFORUM Agreement. 
 
To prevent forum-shopping by non-European investors, the Agreement should expressly 
foreclose, in relation to any investment covered by the Agreement, access by the respective 
investor to dispute settlement under other investment treaties where the investor would not 
qualify for coverage under the Agreement. 
 
                                                 
44 Part III, Article 20(2).  
45 Part III, Article 19(1). 
46 Part III, Article 21(1). 
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5. Recommendations for other ACP regions 
 
Other ACP states embarking on negotiations with the EU need to ensure they have assessed 
the degree to which the costs of the increased foreign investment and ownership that is 
enabled by an EPA – including the costs of imposing treaty restrictions on measures aimed 
at development or regional integration, and the liabilities to claims under the EPA and other 
investment treaties – are clearly outweighed by benefits of increased investment or by other 
benefits of the EPA. 
 
In the course of this assessment, ACP states should determine existing and projected 
domains of foreign ownership within the economy so as to identify those in which the 
amount of foreign investment at stake has the potential to trigger disputes with a foreign 
investor or its home state. This should include an assessment of the degree to which market 
access commitments in an EPA will expand foreign investment and the corresponding 
liabilities of the state to arbitration claims. 
 
Thus, ACP states should consider their position not only in terms of costs and benefits of 
their commitments to market access in sectors covered by an EPA, but also in terms of their 
post-establishment commitments under other investment treaties. They may also wish to 
link EPA negotiations to the renegotiation of existing investment treaties in order to limit 
their liabilities arising from forum-shopping, undue restrictions on the right to regulate at the 
post-establishment stage, and the structural bias against capital-importing states in investor-
state arbitration. 
 
ACP states should also avoid strictly any further commitments to investor-state arbitration in 
an EPA or any other treaty. They should limit future consents to investor-state arbitration to 
consents in investment contracts that are concluded in anticipation of a specific project 
whose benefits are judged clearly to outweigh the significant exposure that consent to 
investor-state arbitration entails. 
 
ACP states should set aside a contingency fund for legal costs and awards arising from 
possible disputes concerning their commitments in any EPA and in other investment 
treaties. ACP states should also develop an in-house capacity for the litigation of claims 
arising from investment disputes. 
 
ACP states should consider the more specific recommendations in the previous section. 
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